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The Integrationist Alternative to the Insanity
Defense: Reflections on the Exculpatory Scope of
Mental Illness in the Wake of the Andrea Yates
Trial
Christopher Slobogin*
I. Introduction
On June 20, 2001, Andrea Yates took the lives of her five children by
drowning them, one by one, in a bathtub.' At her trial on capital murder
charges nine months later, she pleaded insanity. Despite very credible
evidence that she had long suffered from serious mental disorder, a Texas jury
2convicted Yates of murder and sentenced her to life in prison. Her tragic and
controversial case led many to question whether the so-called "M'Naghten"
test for insanity, which forms the basis for the insanity defense in Texas,3
adequately defines the exculpatory effect of mental disorder.
This article is based on a talk given at a conference entitled "The
Affirmative Defense of Insanity in Texas," which took place in the wake of
the Yates trial.4 The organizers of the conference,5 who wanted to solicit
* Stephen C. O'Connell Professor of Law, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of
Law.
1. Lisa Teachey, Yates' Lawyers Plan to Enter Insanity Plea, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (July 31,
2001) at IA.
2. Id.
3. TEx. PENAL CODE § 8.01 provides that "[it is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the
time of the conduct charged, the actor, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, did not know that
his conduct was wrong." This language is similar, but not identical, to the M'Naghten test. See infra
text accompanying notes 15-19.
4. Christopher Slobogin, The Integrationist and Mens Rea Alternatives to the Insanity Defense,
Address at The Affirmative Defense of Insanity in Texas Conference, Austin, Tex. (Feb. 7, 2003).
5. The sponsors of the conference were the Texas Society of Psychiatric Physicians, the Texas
Criminal Defense Lawyers Association, the Texas District and County Attorneys Association, the State
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varying views of the insanity defense, assigned to me the mission of
defending the M'Naghten test. They also asked me to defend two alternatives
to the M'Naghten test: the "Mens Rea Alternative," which restricts evidence
of mental disorder to the issue of whether the accused had the mens rea for
the offense charged, and "Integrationist Alternative," which links the defenses
available to people with mental illness to those defenses available to
defendants who are not mentally ill. In this article, I take on this somewhat
contradictory set of tasks.
My principal method of defending M'Naghten, the Mens Rea
Alternative and the Integrationist Alternative will be to attack all other
formulations of the insanity defense as overbroad. But I will also say a few
positive things about M'Naghten, and I will be particularly enthusiastic about
the Integrationist scheme, an approach that I first proposed three years ago.6
On the other hand the Mens Rea Alternative is difficult to support, and I will
do so only half-heartedly. Judging from what I know of the her case, Andrea
Yates should have been excused under all but the latter test,7 and thus the jury
in her case, had it correctly applied M'Naghten, should have acquitted her.
The main purpose of this article, however, is not to second-guess the result in
that particular case but to explore in some detail the exculpatory scope of
mental disorder in criminal cases.
8
II. A Short History of the Insanity Defense through the M'Naghten Case
The insanity tests that preceded the M'Naghten formulation all
focused on cognitive-as opposed to volitional-impairment, and all required
an extremely high degree of impairment. In the 13th century, Bracton defined
an insane person as one who lacks "sense and reason."9 In the 17th century,
Lord Coke stipulated that to be insane the accused must not have known what
Bar of Texas Committee on Legal Services to the Poor in Criminal Matters and its Committee on
Disability Issues, and the American Journal of Criminal Law.
6. Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental Disability in Criminal
Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199 (2000).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 124-25.
8. I do so recognizing that subtle changes in language of the type discussed in this paper may
have no practical impact. See Norman Finkel et al., Insanity Defenses: From the Juror's Perspective,"
9 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 77 (1985) (finding no significant differences in outcome using six different
insanity instructions). Consider these counter-arguments. First, some research suggests that changes in
language are not futile. See Ingo Kielitz, Researching and Reforming the Insanity Defense, in CURRENT
ISSUES IN MENTAL DISABILITY LAW 57, 57-61 (1987) (claiming that acquittal rates increased in five
states when M'Naghten is replaced with a broader test). Second, even if jurors are not affected by
changes in language, experts, attorneys and judges can be, as they make strategic and admissibility
decisions. See American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, Commentary to
Standard 7-6.1, at 343 (1989). Third, the test language used can affect public perceptions of the insanity
defense, mental illness and the criminal justice system as a whole. See infra text accompanying notes
131-32. Finally, of course, there is theoretical value in constructing a formulation that correctly
captures the exculpatory impact of mental illness.
9. See DONALD H.J. HERMANN, The Insanity Defense: Philosophical, Historical and Legal
Perspectives 23 (1983) (quoting Henrici de Bracton, De Legibus et Conseutudinibus Anglaie).
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he was doing and "lack[] the ability of mind and reason,"' and a century later
Lord Hale demanded an absence of "understanding and will."I At about the
same time, Justice Tracy equated the insane with wild beasts, and required "a
total[] deprivation of... understanding and memory"'12 for an acquittal on
mental disorder grounds.
The early 1800s saw the advent of the "right-wrong" test that
eventually developed into M'Naghten.13 Under this test as well, winning an
insanity claim was very difficult. Typically, the accused was convicted if he
had intended to commit the crime, no matter how "crazy" he may have been
at the time of the offense.'
4
Finally, in 1843, came the M'Naghten case. Suffering from what we
would today call paranoid schizophrenia, Daniel M'Naghten came to believe
that he was being harassed by members of the Tory Party, and eventually
attempted to kill the head of the Party, Prime Minister Peel, (killing Peel's
secretary instead). 15 M'Naghten raised the insanity defense and was acquitted
at trial. On appeal, the House of Lords devised the so-called "M'Naghten"
Test. The first part of the test excuses "a defect in reason that results in the
inability to know the nature and quality of the act,"' 16 a formulation that is
very similar to the medieval tests. But the second part of the test recognizes
an excuse even if the person knew the nature and quality of the act, as long as
he or she "did not know that the act was wrong."'
17
A third part of the House of Lords' opinion is not as well known.
Toward the end of the M'Naghten opinion the Lords announced a special test
for cases of "partial delusion," or what today might be called an encapsulated
delusion. According to the Lords, individuals with partial delusions should be
placed "in the same situation as to responsibility as if the fact with respect to
which the delusion exists were real.' ' 18  Putting that concept in modem
English, a person is insane under this test if, assuming the delusion to be true,
the person would be justified in committing the act. The Lords' example of
this situation posited a person who kills another because he delusionally
believes that the victim was about to kill him. That person would be excused
under the "partial delusion" formulation, the Lords said, because killing to
defend oneself against deadly force is a justifiable action.' 9 In contrast, the
10. Id. at 24.
11. MATHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 30 (1736).
12. Rex v. Arnold, 16 Ho.St.Tr. 764-65 (1724).
13. See Anthony Platt & Bernard Diamond, The Origins of the "Right and Wrong" Test of
Criminal Responsibility and Its Subsequent Development in the United States: An Historical Survey, 54
CAL. L. REV. 1227, 1250-57 (1966).
14. See Slobogin, supra note 6, at 1209 n. 35.
15. See THOMAS MAEDER, CRIME AND MADNESS: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF THE
INSANITY DEFENSE 27-29 (1985).
16. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. at 722.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 723.
19. Id.
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Lords opined, if a person kills another delusionally believing that the victim
besmirched his character, there is no legal excuse, because killing in response
to a slur on one's name is never justifiable.20  I will return to this partial
delusion test later, because it is very closely related to the Integrationist
Alternative that I have proposed.
Inl. Alternatives to M'Naghten
From its inception, the M'Naghten Test was criticized as too rigid.
21
Under M'Naghten, a person is excused only if he or she does not "know"
about the wrongfulness of the act. The most famous modification of this
language is the test proposed by the American Law Institute (ALI). In its
Model Penal Code the ALl provided that insanity exists when, as a result of
mental disease or defect, an offender "lacked substantial capacity to
appreciate the criminality or wrongfulness of his conduct.' 22 (There is also a
lack-of-control prong to the ALl test, but discussion of that prong is deferred
for the moment.23) This formulation works two changes in the M'Naghten
Test. One is that, on its face, the ALI test does not require the black-or-white
analysis that M'Naghten does. It speaks in terms of substantial lack of
experience and capacity, as opposed to an inability to know the wrongfulness
of the act. Second, the ALl test uses the word "appreciate" as opposed to the
word "know." The latter modification was meant to provide an excuse to
those who might "know" that the criminal act was wrong, but who are unable
to internalize the wrongfulness of the act.24
The ALl test proved very popular; well over half the states adopted it
in the two decades following its drafting.25 But after the acquittal of John
Hinckley on insanity grounds in 1982, a number of jurisdictions revisited the
insanity issue. Representative of the kinds of changes that came after
Hinckley's acquittal is the federal test for insanity, adopted in 1984. That test
requires the presence of a severe mental illness, not just a "mental disease or
defect." 26 The federal test also moves back toward M'Naghten's "either/or"
approach by limiting insanity to those cases in which the person was unable
to appreciate the wrongfulness of the act; the word "substantial" has been
20. See id.
21. See ISAAC RAY, A TREATISE ON THE MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE OF INSANITY 42-43 (Winfred
Overhholser ed., 1962) (first published in 1833).
22. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(l)(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 33-34.
24. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt. 3 at 271 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). "The use of
appreciate' rather than 'know' conveys a broader sense of understanding than simple cognition." Id.
25. MICHAEL L. PERLIN, MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 15.07, at 302
(1989).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 20 (1984). "It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any federal statute
that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of
severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of
his acts." Id.
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removed.27 On the other hand, the federal test continues to use the
appreciation language. Thus, the federal test is arguably broader than the
original M'Naghten formulation using the word "know."
Also noteworthy is one other kind of cognitive test, to date not
adopted in any jurisdiction, which focuses on the rationality of the offender's
beliefs. The underlying theme of the various rationality formulations, of
which there are several (all proposed by academics), is that knowledge of
wrongfulness is not at the core of criminal insanity.2 8 Instead, those who
devised these tests suggest, the focus of an excuse based on mental disorder
ought to be the desires and beliefs that seem to motivate the crime-in
particular, the intelligibility, consistency and coherence of the desires and
beliefs that explain the offense.29 If those desires and beliefs are unintelligible
and inconsistent with one another, or otherwise the result of a seriously
defective reasoning process, then a person should be considered insane.3°
Those are the most significant modem variations on the cognitive
tests for insanity. But this listing does not bring to an end the litany of
insanity formulations. M'Naghten has been criticized not only for its rigidity,
but also on the ground that it does not take into account disordered people
who might know right from wrong, but who nonetheless are "compelled" to
commit the criminal act.3' In other words, these critics argue, M'Naghten
improperly ignores cases where the primary impact of mental disorder is
volitional impairment. Thus, as early as the mid-nineteenth century, a
number of jurisdictions also endorsed the so-called Irresistible Impulse Test,
which focuses on whether the person "has lost the power to choose between
the right and wrong and to avoid doing the act in question, such that free
agency is destroyed.'
32
Like M'Naghten, the Irresistible Impulse Test was criticized as too
rigid,33 because it requires an irresistible impulse, the destruction of "free
agency." Accordingly, the Model Penal Code drafters, as they did with
27. Id.
28. See HERBERT FINGARETTE & ANN FINGARETTE HASSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 218 (1979) (proposing a defense if the accused lacked "capacity for rational
conduct"); MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP 245 (1985)
(An excuse exists when the accused is "so irrational as to be nonresponsible."); Stephen J. Morse,
Immaturity and Irresponsibility, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 24 (1997) ("Rationality ... is the
most general, important prerequisite to being morally responsible."); Benjamin B. Sendor, Crime as
Communication: An Interpretive Theory of the Insanity Defense and the Mental Elements of Crime, 74
GEO. L.J. 1371, 1415 (1986) ("Irrationality is a vital aspect of the exculpatory nature of insanity .. ");
ROBERT F. SCHOPP, AUTOMATISM, INSANITY, AND THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY: A
PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 215 (1991) ("A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if he performed
that conduct while suffering major distortion of his cognitive capacities ... ").
29. One of the more complete expositions of the irrationality idea is found in MOORE, supra note
28, at 100-108. See also, SCHOPP, supra note 28, at 185-87.
30. MOORE, supra note 28, at 195-98.
31. See Parsons v. State, 2 So. 854, 856-57 (Ala. 1887) (summarizing authorities who argued
against cognitive-only tests).
32. Id. at 866.
33. See MODEL PENAL CODE COMMENTARIES § 4.01(1)(Official Proposed Draft 1962), at 172.
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cognitive impairment, broadened the volitional impairment test by providing
that a person is insane if he or she lacked "substantial capacity to conform
behavior to the requirements of the law."
34
One final volitional standard that should be mentioned is the
"product" test, which states simply that a person should be found insane for
any crime that is the product of a mental disease or defect. The product test
first assumed prominence in 1954, when it was adopted by the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals in the famous Durham v. United States
decision.35 After two decades, however, the imprecision and potential breadth
of this test eventually led the court to reverse itself,36 and today only one
jurisdiction adheres to the product formulation.37
These are the predominant cognitive and volitional tests of insanity
that have been adopted or proposed. My defense of M'Naghten, and of the
alternatives to it that were noted earlier, will consist primarily of an attack
on all the post-M'Naghten formulations. I start with the volitional tests,
which I lump together under the rubric "Volitional Test", then discuss the
tests that focus on lack of appreciation of wrongfulness (the "Appreciation
Test"), and end with an analysis of tests that look at the offender's
rationality (the "Rationality Test").
A. Arguments Against the Volitional Test
The Volitional Test for insanity should be rejected for both
conceptual and practical reasons. The conceptual problem is that an excuse
based on volitional impairment is not consistent with a criminal justice system
premised on free will. Before developing this point, two categories of
"volitionally-impaired" people who should be excused need to be identified.
First, some people, such as those subject to seizures, literally cannot control
their bodily movements during certain actions and thus should be excused.
This type of non-volitional activity rarely results in crime,38 however, and in
any event is best conceptualized as an "involuntary" act rather than as
insanity.39 Second, some people who have strong inclinations to commit
criminal acts should be excused because they also meet the cognitive test for
insanity. For instance, as developed further later, the person with "command
hallucinations" who feels compelled to kill because God has told him that the
34. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1)(Official Proposed Draft 1962).
35. 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The test was first proposed by Isaac Ray, over one century
earlier. See HENRY WEIHOFEN, THE URGE TO PUNISH: NEW APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF
MENTAL IRRESPONSIBILITY FOR CRIME 5 (1956).
36. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
37. See State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399, 442 (1870).
38. GARY MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR
MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 219 (2d ed. 1997) (arguing that "[elpilepsy will
rarely give rise to a mental state defense.").
39. Deborah Denno, Crime and Unconsciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L.
REV. 269, 284-85 (2002).
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world will otherwise be destroyed should be excused under a cognitive test as
well as under a volitional one.40 Aside from these two groups, people who
appear to be compelled to commit crimes should not be excused in a society
that assumes people are autonomous actors.
The volitional impairment argument proffered by those who do not
fit in these two groups comes in one of two forms: the predisposition claim
and the subjective urge claim. The former type of claim goes something like
this: "I have characteristics or have experienced events that are highly
correlated with criminal behavior; therefore I am compelled or strongly
predisposed to commit crime." Defendants who assert the "extra male
chromosome" defense,4' an excuse based on abnormal brain patterns,42 or the
rotten social background defense 43 are making this type of claim. Note that,
although these people can plausibly claim that they have a mental disorder,
they do not claim that they did not intend the criminal act or that they
committed it for "crazy" reasons. They are asserting simply that their
criminal behavior is driven by factors outside their control.
As a dramatic illustration of why this type of claim should not
prevail, consider a recent study reported in the journal Science, which found
that 85% of a group of individuals who had both been abused as children and
registered low MAOA neurotransmitter levels had committed crimes against
persons by age twenty-six.44 It is rare to find such a high correlation between
just two variables and crime, on the surface making these individuals
particularly strong candidates for a volitional defense. But note that 15% of
the sample did not commit crimes. More importantly, even if the entire
sample had committed violent acts, or even if we could identify one or more
variables that distinguish the 85% from the 15% (such as more substance
abuse or lower socioeconomic status), an excuse for these people on
volitional grounds would be a conceptual mistake, because in principle we
would then have to excuse all crime. The only difference between the sample
described in Science and any other group of criminals is that with other
groups more than two variables are needed to explain the criminal behavior.
Identification of the correlates of crime (whether they are two, or a dozen, in
40. See infra text accompanying note 123. Cf Rex v. Hadfield, 27 How. St. Tr. 1281, 1283,
1322, 1323, 1356 (1800) (acquitting under the medieval tests a defendant who believed God had told
him to sacrifice himself to save the world and who chose assassination of the King as the best way of
assuring his demise).
41. See, e.g., People v. Yukl, 83 Misc.2d 364 (N.Y. 1975).
42. This was one of the arguments made in the Hinckley case. See ALAN A. STONE, LAW,
PSYCHIATRY AND MORALrrY 86 (1984) (discussing CT scan of Hinckley, which showed a "widening"
of sulci in the brain).
43. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander and Murdock, 71 F.2d 923 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
44. Caspi Avshalom et al., Role of Genotype in the Cycle of Violence in Maltreated Children, 297
SCIENCE 851 (2002) (Over 85% of a large sample of males who had both low levels of MAOA neuro-
transmitter and were mistreated as children developed some form of antisocial behavior by the time
they were twenty-six.).
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number) does not mean the crime is compelled; in the words of Michael
Moore, "causation is not compulsion."45
The second form of volitional claim, which might be combined with
the first, is that the individual "feels" strong urges to commit crime at the time
the criminal conduct takes place. For instance, the psychotic individual who
hears voices telling him to kill may experience a powerful urge to commit
crime. But that claim is also true of pedophiles, repeat rapists, "sudden" or
serial murderers and assaulters, and thieves who steal to feed an addiction.4 6
It may even be true of the greedy corporate executive who manipulates
accounts, or of the teenage boy who, on a Friday night, wants to have
intercourse with an underage girlfriend. The subjectively experienced urges
of a person with mental illness are not provably greater than the urges of
people we would never think of excusing.47 If there is a distinction between
the psychotic individual and the others mentioned above, it is based in
cognitive, not volitional, impairment.
A proponent of the Volitional Test might object that the test is only
meant to excuse offenders who are volitionally impaired because of a severe
mental disease or defect, such as psychosis. But nothing about the Volitional
Test explains why that should be. One would think that people who truly
find it hard to stop themselves from committing a crime should be excused
regardless of the type of disorder causing the crime. (The same psychosis-
only argument is also made in an effort to save the Appreciation Test, and is
discussed further in connection with that test.)
Even if compulsion can be an excuse in theory, these various
observations suggest an independent, pragmatic reason why volitional
impairment should not be an excuse. It is expressed in the old adage that
distinguishing between the irresistible impulse and the impulse that is not
resisted is difficult, if not impossible.48 Considerable research on impulsivity
has taken place in recent years. But we still do not know how to measure the
45. Michael Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1130 (1985).
46. See, e.g., AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL-TEXT REVISED 566 (4th ed. 2004) (hereinafter DSM-IV-TR) (The "essential" features of a
paraphilia (e.g., pedophilia, exhibitionism, sexual sadism) are "recurrent, intense sexually arousing
fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors generally involving 1) nonhuman objects, 2) the suffering or
humiliation of oneself or one's partners, or 3) children or other nonconsenting persons"); Id. at 674
(pathological gamblers experience "repeated unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back, or stop
gambling" and may resort to "forgery, fraud, theft, or embezzlement to finance gambling."). For actual
cases, see Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 355 (1997) (recounting sex offender who stated that the
only way he could stop molesting children would be "to die"); Rita Giordano, Gambling Embezzler
Gets 31 Months in U.S. Prison, PHILA. INQUIRER, Jan. 4, 2002, at B5 (reporting a reduction in sentence
for embezzlement by a compulsive gambler because, according to the judge, her disorder "significantly
impaired her ability to control her wrongful behavior").
47. Indeed, recent research indicates that people with serious mental illness are no more likely to
commit violent crime than the general population. Paul S. Appelbaum et al., Violence and Delusions:
Data from the MacArthur Violence Risk Study, 157 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 566 (2000) (reporting data that
suggest delusions do not increase the overall risk of violence in persons with mental illness).
48. United States v. Lyons, 741 F.2d 243, 248 (5" Cir. 1984) (quoting AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC
ASSOCIATION, STATEMENT ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 11).
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phenomenon. One review concluded that "[r]esearchers need to be very
cautious when selecting impulsivity measures, because the different measures
appear to be assessing very different constructs, even when they use the same
methodologies. ' 49  Another review found that "[s]tudies of adults,
adolescents, and children show that impulsivity measures are often
uncorrelated with one another, and that impulsivity is a multi-dimensional
construct. There have been too few studies to determine the nature of the
underlying factors.' 50 In short, when we discuss "impulsivity," we literally
do not know what we are talking about.
In sum, the Volitional Test creates a huge potential for chaos in the
culpability-based criminal justice system we have today. Compulsion is not
susceptible to measurement. If we nonetheless engage in guessing about
volitional impairment, and conclude, for instance, that some psychotic
individuals are so compelled that they should be excused, then we probably
have to excuse pedophiles and many other garden-variety criminals as well,
because they also claim to experience very strong urges. If we excuse those
who were abused as children and have low serotonin levels because 85% of
them commit crimes, then we probably also must excuse every criminal with
an anti-social personality disorder (which would empty quite a few cells in
today's prisons), because at least 85% of people with this disorder commit
crimes as well.51 Those conclusions do not make sense in our present system
of criminal justice.
B. Arguments Against the Appreciation Test
The Appreciation Test suffers from the same type of conceptual
problem that afflicts the Volitional Test: if the Appreciation Test is applied
honestly, it will excuse numerous people whom we do not want to excuse.
Take, for instance, the offender with a psychopathic personality. Dr. Robert
Hare, the leading researcher on this particular diagnosis, summarizes the
psychopathic personality as follows: "[Psychopaths] seem unable to 'get into
the skin' or to 'walk in the shoes' of others, except in a truly intellectual
sense .... [They] are glib and superficial, lack remorse or guilt, lack empathy,
49. James D.A. Parker & R. Michael Bagby, Impulsivity in Adults: A Critical Review of
Measurement Approaches, in IMPULSIVITY: THEORY, ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT 142, 154-55
(Christopher D. Webster & Margaret A. Jackson, eds., 1997) (hereinafter IMPULSIVrrY).
50. Judy Zaparniuk & Steven Taylor, Impulsivity in Children and Adolescents, in IMPULSIVrrY
supra note 49, at 158, 174.
51. Indeed, antisocial personality disorder and criminality are almost congruent. DSM-IV-TR,
supra note 46, at 706 (describing criteria for antisocial personality disorder to include "failure to
conform to social norms with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly performing acts
that are grounds for arrest," "irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated by repeated physical fights or
assaults," "reckless disregard for safety of self or others," and "evidence of conduct disorder with onset
before age 15 years").
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have shallow emotions and lack responsibility." 52 This type of person does
not meet the M'Naghten Test; psychopaths know right from wrong, they
know when they are committing a crime, and they know society views their
crime as wrong. But they do not internalize the enormity of the criminal act.
By definition, they do not emotionally appreciate its wrongfulness, If we
apply the Appreciation Test straightforwardly, we have to excuse them.
Probably for that reason, the drafters of the ALI test declared, in a
supplementary paragraph to their insanity formulation, that a mental disease
or defect that is "manifested solely by repeated antisocial behavior" should
not form the predicate for the insanity defense.53 On its face, this language
does not accomplish its apparent goal, since the diagnosis of psychopathy and
its close relative, antisocial personality disorder, require other symptoms
besides repeated crime.54 But assuming psychopathy is meant to be
subsumed by this provision, an insanity test that has to exclude by fiat a
mental disorder that clearly falls within its terms has not done a good job of
identifying the relevant excusing condition.
Another class of people who commit a large amount of crime is
comprised of people with mild retardation, defined as those with an
intelligence quotient of between 50 and 70.55 Consider this observation about
their mental capacity: "Mildly retarded persons may be able to distinguish
right from wrong in the abstract, but they have difficulty applying abstract
concepts in specific actual settings and are unable to appreciate the
wrongfulness of what they do." 56 If this statement is accurate, people with
mild retardation, while generally sane under M'Naghten, should be found
insane under the Appreciation Test. Yet the latter result would be repugnant
to many people, including some advocates for people with mental
retardation.57  Criminals with mild mental retardation should escape
52. ROBERT D. HARE, WITHOUT CONSCIENCE: THE DISTURBING WORLD OF THE PSYCHOPATHS
AMONG Us 34, 44 (1993).
53. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(2)(Proposed Official Draft).
54. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 46, at 706 (indicating that the criteria for antisocial personality
disorder can include "impulsivity or failure to plan ahead," "consistent irresponsibility," and "lack of
remorse," any one of which may be lacking in some recidivists).
55. It has been estimated that between 9.5% and 29% of people in jail or prison suffer from
mental retardation. See SAMUEL BRAKEL, JOHN PARRY, & BARBARA WEINER, THE MENTALLY
DISABLED AND THE LAW 736-37 (1985).
56. C. Benjamin Crisman & Rockne J. Chickinell, The Mentally Retarded Offender in Omaha-
Douglas County, 8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 622, 646 (1975). See also, James Ellis, Mentally Retarded
Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 414, 441 (1985) (arguing that, although the shift from
"know" to "appreciate" is "... relevant to the mental condition of some mentally ill defendants, it is
particularly important in cases involving mental retardation. When a retarded defendant's
understanding of the wrongfulness of his conduct is in question, it is often a 'lack of appreciation for
the subtleties of social interaction and abstract concepts of right and wrong that impair his behavior."').
57. See AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE MENTALLY RETARDED, POSITION STATEMENT ON
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, available at http://www.aamr.org/Policies/pos-criminal-justice.shtml ("People
with mental retardation must be exempt from the death penalty but not from other appropriate
punishment, on a case-by-case basis.").
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execution, as the Supreme Court recently held,58 but few should escape
conviction.
The Appreciation Test, honestly applied, might also excuse many
people whose principal dysfunction appears to be volitional rather than
cognitive. Consider State v. Companaro,59 involving a person who
embezzled money to support his pathological gambling habit. Here is an
excerpt from the expert testimony in the case:
Well, here's a man who is a law enforcement officer, who knows
the law well, who knows about right and wrong, [and therefore
would not meet the M'Naghten Test] but who is in a desperate
strait. He's under a tremendous amount of stress at that point, does
not consider right and wrong. I don't think that becomes part of the
thinking process. His process then is to survive. He's losing his
job, his family, his children, his reputation, everything is going
down.6°
Companaro was acquitted by reason of insanity under the Appreciation
Test.61 His case illustrates how that test permits volitional impairment to be
described and excused in terms of cognitive impairment: People under stress,
so the argument goes, do not think through the consequences of their actions,
and thus do not appreciate the wrongfulness of what they are doing. If that
argument is allowed, however, prohibition of volitionally-based insanity
claims will accomplish very little, because virtually all volitional impairment
cases, not just the small subset of them described earlier, could be re-
characterized as cognitive impairment cases. Indeed, even many people who
do not have "mental disorders" as we normally define them (e.g., those with
tempers or idiosyncratic reactions to provocation 62) might not "consider right
and wrong" at the time they commit crime, for reasons that could be said to
be beyond their control.
One solution to the problems identified above would be to limit
application of the Appreciation Test to cases of psychosis, as the federal test
appears to do, and as Professor Richard Bonnie suggested in his paper for the
Andrea Yates conference.63 Although that move may conform to most
58. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). See Christopher Slobogin, Is Atkins the Antithesis
or Apotheosis of Anti Discrimination Principles?: Sorting Out the Groupwide Effect of Exempting
People with Mental Retardation from the Death Penalty, - Ala. L. Rev. __ (forthcoming).
59. Union County Indictment no. 632079 (Sup.Ct. N.J. Crim. Div. 1981) (cited in RALPH
REISNER ET AL., LAW & MENTAL HEALTH, CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ASPECTs 429 (3d ed. 1998)).
60. Id.
61. See id.
62. See, e.g., Freddo v. State, 155 S.W. 170 (Tenn. 1913) (involving the case of an orphan
defendant, particularly sensitive to insults to womanhood, who killed after being called a "son of a
bitch"); Bedder v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions, 1 W.L.R. 1119 (H.L. 1954) (involving the case of a
sexually impotent and emotionally distressed defendant who killed after being taunted for his inability
to have intercourse).
63. Richard Bonnie, Why "Appreciation of Wrongfulness" is the Morally Preferable Standard for
the Insanity Defense, Address at The Affirmative Defense of Insanity in Texas, (Feb.7, 2003)
(transcript available at The Texas Society of Psychiatric Physicians) [hereinafter, Bonnie, Appreciation
of Wrongfulness]. Bonnie's comments at the conference cross-referenced his earlier paper, The Moral
325
HeinOnline  -- 30 Am. J. Crim. L. 325 2002-2003
326 AM. J. CRIM. L. [VOL. 30:315
people's intuitions, the rationale for privileging psychosis over other forms of
mental disorder is not obvious. Recent research indicates that people with
psychosis are both less influenced by their delusions than intuition would lead
us to believe, 64 and less dangerous than most lay people think.65 In other
words, as I suggested earlier, psychotic people may not be any more
predisposed or compelled to commit crime than many other types of people.
We have also learned much more about other kinds of mental
disorders. Consider, once again, psychopathy. Professor Bonnie describes
the kind of "severe" disorder that should form the predicate for insanity as "a
pathological process within the brain, over which the person has no control,
leading to mental experience that is qualitatively different from ordinary
experience. 66 Psychopathy is certainly pathological, possibly congenital and
probably neurological.67 Further, it is a condition that is not easily within the
person's "control," and indeed is much less so than the condition of a severely
mentally ill person for whom there is at least some meaningful treatment.68
Finally, psychopaths are clearly alienated "from ordinary experience." 6
9
The results of one simple study graphically make the latter point. A
group of psychopaths and a control group were hooked up to a device that
measures physiological responses, and both groups were read five words:
"chair", "table", "apple", "house", "murder". The control group-the non-
psychopathic group-registered a significant blip on the screen when the word
"murder" was announced. 70  But that word occasioned no reaction from the
psychopaths. Their emotional response was non-existent. 71  That kind of
Basis of the Insanity Defense, 69 A.B.A. J. 194 (Feb. 1983), which proposed that the definition of
mental disease or defect be as follows: "those severely abnormal mental conditions that grossly and
demonstrably impair a person's perception or understanding of reality and that are not attributable
primarily to the voluntary ingestion of alcohol or other psychoactive substances." Id. at 197.
64. See Appelbaum et al, supra note 47.
65. Henry J. Steadman et al., Violence by People Discharged from Acute Psychiatric Inpatient
Facilities and by Others in the Same Neighborhoods, 55 ARCH. GEN. PSYCHIATRY 393 (1998)
("[Tihere was no significant difference between the prevalence of violence by patients without
symptoms of substance abuse and the prevalence of violence by others living in the same
neighborhoods who were also without symptoms of substance abuse.").
66. Bonnie, Appreciation of Wrongfulness, supra note 63, at 11.
67. See 2 PSYCHIATRY 1299 (Allan Tasman et al., eds. 1997) ("[Tlhere is considerable support
from twin, family, and adoption studies for a genetic contribution to the etiology of the criminal,
delinquent tendencies of persons with ASPD [anti-social personality disorder].").
68. Compare Otto Kemberg, The Psychotherapeutic Management of Psychopathic, Narcissistic,
and Paranoid Transferences in PSYCHOPATHY: ANTISOCIAL, CRIMINAL, AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 372,
377 (Theodore Millon et al. eds) (1998) (The prognosis for effectively treating psychopathy "is
practically zero.") to REISNER ET AL., supra note 59, at 49-50 (reporting response rates of people with
psychosis to anti-psychotic medication of approximately 75 %).
69. See Bonnie, Appreciation of Wrongfulness, supra note 63, at 6.
70. Reid Meloy, Psychopaths and Criminal Responsibility, Address at Mental Health Law in the
21st Century Conference, San Diego, Calif. (March 23, 2000).
71. Id. See also, Mary K. Feeney, Why They Kill: Psychopaths Have No Feelings for Their
Victims, HARTFORD COURANT, Oct. 21, 1997, at F1 (Compared to individuals in the normal control
group, psychopaths exhibit smaller changes in heart rate and in skin conductance when exposed to fear-
provoking language and pictures.).
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reaction is as out of touch with "ordinary experience" as delusions are, albeit
in a different way.
Even if limiting the Appreciation Test to gross mental disorder makes
sense, the test may excuse people who should not be excused. Charles
Manson and his gang killed several wealthy white people, including the
actress Sharon Tate.72  Why? Manson, who has been diagnosed with
schizophrenia,73 apparently believed that the world would eventually be taken
over by African-Americans, who would kill off most of the white race in a
bloodbath. Manson meant to prevent that debacle by slaughtering white
people and then planting evidence designed to frame African-Americans for
the crimes; in that way, he believed, the white world would be alerted to the
dangers presented by the black race.74
Manson would not meet the M'Naghten test because knew it was
wrong to kill Sharon Tate. However, a plausible argument could have been
made (although it was not, because he refused to allow evidence of insanity to
be introduced75) that Manson did not appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct due to his mental disorder. Rather, he felt justified in doing what he
did, for he saw his crimes as a necessary means of preventing the perceived
impending massacre by African-Americans.
The same kind of analysis could be applied to the "Unabomber", Ted
Kaczynski. The people to whom he mailed letter bombs all were somehow
involved with technology.76 From what we know from public documents,
Kaczynski, who was clearly suffering from schizophrenia,77 chose these
victims because he wanted to signal that if people like them failed to curb
society's reliance on scientific gimmickry, the world as we know it would
78end. His crimes, to which he eventually pleaded guilty so that his
motivations would not be labeled "crazy"7 were his way of preventing the
destruction of the world by technology. Kaczynski knew that sending letter
bombs would result in deaths and that it was wrong to kill people (thus his
72. See People v. Charles Manson et al., 61 Cal.App.3d 102, 124 (2d Dist. 1976).
73. Brian Melley, Charles Manson Denied Parole for a 10th Time, at
http://userwww.sfsu.edu/-tarnamail/april02wire.html (April 24, 2002) ("[Plsychiatric reports show
[Manson] is a violent schizophrenic.").
74. VINCENT BUGLIOSI, WITH CURT GENTRY, HELTER SKELTER: THE TRUE STORY OF THE
MANSON MURDERS 331-33 (1974).
75. Manson fired his first attorney for requesting a psychiatric evaluation. Id. at 370, 532.
76. See William Finnegan, Defending the Unabomber, NEW YORKER, Mar. 16, 1998, at 52.
77. William Glaberson, Lawyers for Kaczynski Agree He Is Competent to Stand Trial, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 21, 1998, at Al (noting that prosecution and defense experts agreed Kaczynski was
suffering from schizophrenia, paranoid type).
78. See William Glaberson, Kaczynski Can't Drop Lawyers or Block a Mental Illness Defense,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1998, at Al (describing a letter from attorney Tony Serra to Judge Burwell stating
that Serra was willing to substitute as Kaczynski's attorney and "suggested that he might argue that Mr.
Kaczynski felt he had to engage in his anti-technology campaign to, ultimately, save lives").
79. Stephen I. Dubner, I Don't Want to Live Long. I Would Rather Get the Death Penalty than
Spend the Rest of My Life in Prison, TIME, Oct. 18, 1999 at 44, 46 (Kaczynski "says he pleaded guilty
last year only to stop his lawyers from arguing he was a paranoid schizophrenic.").
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efforts at maintaining seclusion and anonymity), so he did not meet the
M'Naghten Test. But a strong argument exists that he did not appreciate the
wrongfulness of his actions, because he felt they were in the service of a
greater good.
One final example from a less publicized case illustrates the same
point. Cruse v. State involved a man who gunned down several people in a
mall because he thought they were trying to turn him into a homosexual.8'
Again, like Manson and Kaczynski, he knew it was legally wrong to kill these
individuals, and he was convicted in a M'Naghten jurisdiction. 82 But one can
make a strong case that he did not appreciate the wrongfulness of his actions,
because he felt justified in preventing these people from changing who he
was.
Perhaps we should excuse people like Manson, Kaczynski or Cruse.
But doing so amounts to providing a defense for virtually any criminal with a
significant mental disorder, because people with psychosis are often
convinced that their actions should be permissible (an attitude, it should be
noted, that is held by many non-psychotic people as well83). The
Appreciation Test, whether applied in its current former or (arbitrarily)
limited to people with gross disorder, is thus overbroad.
C. Arguments Against the Rationality Tests
Although, as noted earlier, the Rationality Test has not been adopted
in any jurisdiction, it does begin to address a key problem associated with the
Appreciation Test. Because it focuses on the intelligibility and consistency of
the person's motivations for crime, rather than on whether he or she
"appreciates" its wrongfulness, the Rationality Test better differentiates
between persons with serious mental disorders and persons who do not have
such disorders. In other words, the Rationality Test limits the types of cases
in which insanity can be raised to cases of serious disorder,84 which is
something the Appreciation Test fails to do on its face. The latter test can
accomplish something similar only by defining mental disease or defect in
terms of gross impairment, in which case it becomes either the same as the
80. 580 So.2d 983 (La. App. 1991).
81. Id. at 989.
82. See id. at 993 (affirming conviction and death sentence).
83. See, e.g., DSM-IV-TR, supra note 46, at 571 (noting that pedophiles often explain their
activities "with excuses or rationalizations that they have 'educational value' for the child, that the child
derives 'sexual pleasure' from them, or that the child was 'sexually provocative'). Two other
examples make the same point. John Gacy, who killed over 20 men, believed he was doing society a
favor by ridding it of homosexual prostitutes. See STEVEN A. EGGER, THE KILLERS AMONG Us 8-12
(2002). And the terrorists who threaten our country believe they are on the right side in a holy war.
84. The Rationality Test advocate who takes this position most unequivocally is Robert Schopp.
SCHOPP, supra note 28, at 215 (defining insanity in terms of a person who is not able to engage in "the
process of practical reasoning that is ordinarily available to an adult who does not suffer major
cognitive disorder.").
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Rationality Test or a narrower version of it. As a practical matter, therefore,
the Rationality Test more efficiently excludes psychopaths and others with
"mere" personality disorders from the purview of the insanity defense
(although, as I argue below, it too is not completely successful in this effort).
The Rationality Test also helps deal with the determinism problem
associated with the Volitional Test. As noted earlier, the deterministic, all-
behavior-is-caused position, which the Volitional Test comes close to
endorsing, poses a substantial threat to a retribution-based criminal justice
system. But those who advocate the Rationality formulation deal with this
dilemma straightforwardly. They admit, or are willing to countenance, that
all behavior is caused by environmental, biological and psychological factors
over which people have little or no control. But they also insist that the only
legally relevant causes for purposes of the insanity defense are the desires and
beliefs that motivate the crime.85 These are the "proximate" causes, the final
causes, of the crime. All other correlates of crime should be irrelevant for
legal purposes, rationality theorists argue. Thus, if the desires and beliefs that
link the individual to the crime are irrational, we should excuse. If the desires
and beliefs are rational, then we should convict regardless of what factors
might contribute to the criminal conduct.
These aspects of the Rationality Test are positive contributions
because they avoid problems associated with other formulations of insanity.
But the rationality test has at least two negative aspects as well. First, as with
the Volitional and Appreciation Tests, the Rationality Test might absolve
people whom most of us would not want to excuse. Consider, for instance,
the case of Jeffrey Dahmer, who killed people, cut them into pieces, put the
body parts in the refrigerator and occasionally ate the remains.86  Why?
Because, according to him, he "didn't want [his victims] to leave," and
because eating their flesh aroused him.87  These desires are far from
"intelligible." They are also inconsistent with other beliefs Dahmer held: he
knew, for instance, that killing his victims would ensure that they would leave
him. The irrationality of his motivations is hard to deny. In contrast, Dahmer
clearly would not be excused under M'Naghten, nor would he have success
even under the pristine Appreciation Test, since he both knew and appreciated
the wrongfulness of his conduct (in the sense that he did not believe his
85. See MOORE, supra note 28, at 190-245; Morse, supra note 28, at 29-30; SCHOPP, supra note
28, at 202.
86. Marilyn Bardsley, Butt Naked!, CRIME LIBRARY (2004), at http://www.crimelibrary.com/
serialkillers/notorious/dahmer/nakedl.html (accessed on Aug. 30, 2003).
87. K. Sifuentes, Guess Who's Coming to Dinner, CRIME WEB, at
http://members.fortuncity.com/mastercrime/thecrimeweb/id8.html (noting that, when asked why he
killed his first victim, Dahmer stated "I didn't want him to leave, that's basically it. I just didn't want
him to leave, that's why this whole nightmare began."). See also, Bardsley, supra note 86, at
http://www.crimelibrary.com/serialkillers/notorious/dahmer/why_4.html (accessed on Aug. 30, 2003)
(recounting psychiatrist who stated that Dahmer "led a rich fantasy life that focused on having complete
control over people").
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actions should be permissible).88 In fact, a jury convicted him in an ALI
jurisdiction.8 9
A rationality theorist might claim, however, that because Dahmer
was not delusional, 90 his thought process was not disordered enough to
warrant a finding of irrationality. 91 In other words, as suggested above,
irrationality could and should be defined very narrowly, to require a formal
thought disorder, like schizophrenia, that manifests a very high level of
unintelligibility, inconsistency and incoherence in connection with the
motivations for crime. If so, the question again becomes: why is psychosis
singled out in this way?
This raises the second problem with the Rationality Test. Those who
advocate for that test argue, I think correctly, that people who are irrational in
the sense just described find it hard to access the right reasons for avoiding
criminal conduct.92 But the key question should be the degree to which they
find this process difficult, as compared to people who are not "irrational."
There is no doubt that the minds of people with schizophrenia function very
differently than the minds of most other people.93  But the research noted
earlier suggests that even people with paranoid ideation remember and are
influenced by criminal prohibitions.94 These findings indicate that people
with delusions or confused thought processes are no more likely to commit
violent acts than people who do not suffer from psychotic symptoms. In other
words, people with mental illness seem to be able to access the right reasons
for acting, perhaps not easily, but well enough to fight the thoughts or desires
that push them in the opposite direction.95
88. Dahmer never contended, either in or out of court, that his actions were justified or explained
by some higher or other good in the way Manson, Kaczynski and Cruse did.
89. Bardsley, supra note 86, at http://www.crimelibrary.comlserialkillers/notorious/
dahmer/trial_5.html (accessed on Aug. 30, 2003).
90. Even the defense never suggested as much. See id.
91. See supra note 84 (describing Schopp's formulation, which in essence requires a formal
thought disorder).
92. See, e.g., Morse, supra note 28, at 30 (stating that irrationality is the preeminent excusing
condition because it will "make it too hard" for a person "to grasp or to be guided by the good reasons
not to offend").
93. See, e.g., COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHIATRY (2003) (containing reports of studies finding that
people with schizophrenia have significant impairments in nonverbal attributions of intentions in
others, semantic memory, and temporal auditory processing); Volume 7 of COGNITIVE
NEUROPSYCHIATRY (2002) (containing reports of studies finding that people with schizophrenia find it
more difficult to inhibit irrelevant stimuli and to judge the duration of events).
94. See supra notes 47 and 65.
95. It should be noted that, in apparent contrast to the MacArthur study's findings that delusions
and hallucinations are not significantly correlated with violence, supra note 47, a more recent review of
the literature concluded that mentally ill individuals are most likely to behave violently "when they (a)
perceive that someone intends to do them harm, (b) believe they have been personally targeted for
harm, (c) perceive the intended harm as a misdeed committed by the perpetrator, (d) believe that they
are in imminent danger, (e) believe that physical force is the best means of protection or retaliation
against the perpetrator, and (f) attribute blame to the perpetrator based on his or her dispositional
qualities, e.g., 'he wishes to harm me because he is evil'." Dale E. McNiel et al., The Relationship
Between Aggressive Attributional Style and Violence by Psychiatric Patients, 71 J. CONSULTING AND
CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY 404, 405 (2003). Far from undermining the assertion in the text, this finding
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On the other hand, some non-psychotic persons have great difficulty
accessing the right reasons for acting at the time they commit crime.
According to the psychiatric profession's diagnostic manual, dependent
personalities may "feel so unable to function alone that they will agree with
things that they feel are wrong rather than risk losing the help of those to
whom they look for guidance. 96 Or consider again the person who kills in a
fit of temper, because of jealousy or out of disproportionate umbrage at a slur;
at the moment of the crime, rage may make accessing the right reasons for
acting impossible for such people.97 It is unlikely that irrationality, qua
serious mental disorder, is always the reason people have a hard time
accessing the right reasons for acting.
Another perspective on the extent to which serious mental disorder is
the appropriate focus of the insanity defense is to assess the notion-one that
seems to underlie not just the Rationality Test but the insanity defense
generally - that people with such disorders are basically good people.
According to this view, the mental disease, not the person's "true"
personality, makes them do bad things. That assumption is worth
challenging. In a book devoted to examining homicides committed by
mentally ill people, Dr. Drew Ross claims, as most people do, that people
who are mentally ill "usually have a good heart underlying their loss of
reality."98  But he goes on to describe a large number of cases where
psychotic people commit homicide for reasons that do not sound so innocent.
For instance, there is the case of Mark, who killed out of delusional
jealousy;99 the case of Ned, who killed in large part because of anger at his
mother; 1°° the case of Maria, who killed a hated uncle;10 1 and the case of
Ernest, who stabbed a young girl perhaps to prevent detection or perhaps out
of envy. 102  These are the same kinds of motivations that might lead a
"normal" person to kill someone else. Is it irrationality qua mental illness that
is causing people to commit these crimes? Or something else?
reinforces the claim that people with mental illness are attuned to societal mores, because they usually
act violently only for "rational" reasons-when they feel threatened. As explained later, see infra text
accompanying notes 119-122, this is precisely the kind of individual who is likely to have a defense
under the Integrationist Alternative.
96. DSM-IV-TR, supra note 46, at 722.
97. Professor Morse, a rationality theorist, suggests that this might be the appropriate outcome
under the irrationality test. Stephen J. Morse, Culpability and Control, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1587, 1649
(1997) ("[C]rimes of 'passion,' committed in heightened emotional states, such as fear and rage ....
may seal off access to the ordinary desires, beliefs, and intentions that permit volitions to resolve the
inevitable conflict by being properly responsive to... background factors."); see also id. at 1636
(wondering whether psychopaths should be excused on irrationality grounds).
98. DREW Ross, LOOKING THROUGH THE EYES OF A KILLER: A PSYCHIATRIST'S JOURNEY
THROUGH THE MURDERER'S WORLD 87 (1998).
99. Id. at 83-87.
100. Id. at 91-93.
101. Id. at 129-32.
102. Id. at 201-04.
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Because M'Naghten focuses on whether mental disorder undermines
one's knowledge of wrongfulness, that test is better at capturing the essence
of insanity than any of the other formulations. The Volitional Test doesn't
work because compulsion should not be an excuse and because, even if it
should be, resistible impulses are impossible to distinguish from impulses that
are not resisted. The Appreciation Test is flawed because it is too broad and
does not distinguish between people with and without significant mental
disorder. The Rationality Test is also too broad or, if defined narrowly in
terms of formal thought disorder, does not adequately identify all people who
have difficulty accessing reasons for avoiding criminal action.
IV. The Integrationist Alternative
That is my defense (by negative implication) of the M'Naghten Test.
As signaled at the outset, however, I believe that M'Naghten is only the
second best means of taking mental disorder into account in our assessments
of criminal culpability. As applied, the word "know" used in M'Naghten is
not that different from the word "appreciate," and broadly construed could
trigger all the problems associated with the Appreciation Test. 103 More
importantly, aside from the partial delusion component of M'Naghten, the test
does not make clear when, if ever, a mentally ill person who believes that his
or her crime is legally wrong, but morally permissible, should be excused.
The Integrationist Alternative, which seeks to integrate people with mental
illness into the system of punishment that already exists for people who are
not mentally ill, addresses these concerns. In theory, at least, it is somewhat
broader than a literal application of the M'Naghten test and is clearly broader
than the medieval tests, but is generally more restrictive than the Volitional,
Appreciation, and Rationality Tests.
The Integrationist Alternative builds on the recognition underlying
modem criminal statutes that individual blameworthiness is the key inquiry of
the criminal law, and that criminal liability should depend on the subjective
beliefs of the individual who commits crime. The leading effort in advancing
this point of view is, as with the insanity defense, the ALI's Model Penal
Code. 1°4 Its provisions regarding self-defense, duress, and mens rea all adopt
a subjective approach to culpability.
With respect to defensive actions, the Model Penal Code promulgates
what could be called the "subjective justification" excuse. According to the
Code, for instance, deadly force may be used whenever "the actor believes
103. Professor Goldstein found, in his review of evidence and instructions in insanity cases, that
M'Naghten's test language is construed liberally, when it is defined at all. ABRAHAM GOLDSTEIN, THE
INSANITY DEFENSE 49-53 (1967).
104. See MODEL PENAL CODE COMMENTARIES, § 2.02 cmt. 2, at 235 (Proposed Official Draft
1962) ("It was believed to be unjust to measure liability for serious criminal offenses on the basis of
what the defendant should have believed or what most people would have intended.").
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that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily
harm, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat."' 5 This
language states that an individual is excused from using deadly force even
when the victim does not actually threaten the actor with death or the other
listed consequences, as long as the actor honestly thinks he is threatened with
them. Thus, this provision is virtually identical to the Partial Delusion Test
that the House of Lords announced in the M'Naghten case; it asks what the
criminal actor believes and excuses him if those beliefs amount to
justification.
The Model Penal Code also subjectifies the duress defense.
Classically, the duress defense exists when a person is coerced into
committing a crime by a serious threat, as when someone holds a gun to the
defendant's head saying, "Commit robbery, or I'll kill you." 106 But the duress
defense under the Model Penal Code also contemplates that an excuse exists
when an actor mistakenly believes a threat to use unlawful force has been
made. Even if the individual is not actually threatened, if the actor thinks he
has been threatened with such force, then he may have a defense under the
Model Penal Code. °7
Finally, the Code subjectifies mens rea. Under the common law, an
individual who committed a criminal act was often assumed to have intended
it,108 and could prevail on a "mistake of fact" defense only if the mistake was
reasonable. 09 The Model Penal Code, in contrast, usually requires an inquiry
into the individual's actual intent and awareness at the time of the crime.
That subjective inquiry, the drafters of the Code posited, is essential to
assessing the blameworthiness of most crimes.' 10 Thus, if the individual did
not intend or was not aware he was committing the conduct that caused the
crime, a defense exists."' Similarly, the individual who did not intend or was
not aware of the result of his crime usually also has a defense. Most
importantly for present purposes, if the individual made a mistake about the
105. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
106. See generally WAYNE LAFAvE, CRIMINAL LAW 467 (2000) (describing duress as available
when the actor reasonably believes that crime short of homicide is necessary to avoid imminent death
or serious bodily injury).
107. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(l)(Proposed Official Draft 1962) (providing for an affirmative
defense when a person commits a crime "because he was coerced to do so by the use of, or a threat to
use, unlawful force against his person or the person of another, that a person of reasonable firmness in
his situation would have been unable to resist") (emphasis added); MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1) cmt.
3, at 380 (Proposed Official Draft 1962) (The intent of this provision "is to give effect to the defense
when an actor mistakenly believes that a threat to use unlawful force has been made.").
108. See generally, LaFave, supra note 106, at 239-240.
109. Id. at 434-37.
110. See supra note 104. The Model Penal Code does permit liability for homicide and a few
other crimes on the basis of negligence, but even here liability accrues only after "considering the
nature and purpose of [the actor's] conduct and the circumstances known to him." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 2.02(2)(d)(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
111. If the individual was not in conscious control of his bodily movements then, as noted earlier,
see supra text accompanying notes 38-39, an involuntary act defense is the proper defense.
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circumstances that comprise the elements of the offense (as to ownership,
identity and so on), then that can be an excuse as well.'" 2
How does all this apply to people with mental illness? The
integrationist argument is that if these defenses are made available to mentally
ill people who commit crime, the insanity defense is unnecessary. Those
mentally ill people who have a subjective justification, subjective duress, or
lack of subjective mens rea defense constitute the universe of people with
mental illness who should be excused.
Before exploring the point further, one final aspect of the Model
Penal Code should be noted. The Code's section on defenses provides that a
person cannot be exculpated if he is responsible for bringing about the
situation requiring a choice of harm or evil." 3 For example, generally an
individual who kills someone because the victim is about to use deadly force
against him is acting in self-defense. But the Code provision just described
indicates that if the perpetrator of the crime provoked the victim into using
deadly force, reliance on self-defense should not succeed. Because the
perpetrator started the confrontation, he is not entitled to a full defense.
Putting all of this together and applying it to people with mental
illness, the Integrationist Alternative might read something like this: A person
shall be excused from an offense if at the time of the offense, by reason of
mental disease or defect, he (a) lacked the subjective mental state for the
conduct, circumstance, or result element of the crime; (b) believed
circumstances existed that, if true, would have justified the offense; or (c)
believed circumstances existed that, if true, would have amounted to duress,
provided that (d) he did not cause any of these mental states by purposely
avoiding treatment knowing that such states would occur without such
treatment.
Here are some examples of how the Integrationist Alternative would
work. 114 Consider first cases involving the absence of subjective mens rea.
In People v. Wetmore,' 15 the defendant was charged with burglary after being
found in another person's apartment wearing that person's clothing. Because
of his mental illness, he thought that both the apartment and the clothing were
112. As Professor Low has noted, the Model Penal Code's subjective approach to mistake of fact
"rejects a judgment expressed in a common-law rule that was centuries in its evolution." Peter W.
Low, The Model Penal Code, the Common Law, and Mistakes of Fact: Recklessness, Negligence, or
Strict Liability?, 129 RUTGERS L.J. 539, 546 (1988).
113. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(2)(Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("When the actor was
reckless or negligent in bringing about the situation requiring a choice of harms or evils ... the
justification afforded by this Section is unavailable in a prosecution for any offense for which
recklessness or negligence, as the case may be, suffices to establish culpability.").
114. Most of these examples are borrowed from my earlier article on the Integrationist approach.
See Slobogin, supra note 6, at 1202-07. That article also argued that there should be a "general
ignorance of the law" excuse, akin to the infancy defense, but that defense would rarely provide an
independent excuse and is not discussed here. Id. at 1240-42.
115. 583 P.2d 1308, 1310 (Cal. 1978).
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his.' " 6 Wetmore could be excused by reason of insanity. But he also could be
excused because he lacked the requisite mental state for the crime charged.
More specifically, he did not have the mens rea for burglary, which requires
breaking into the house of another knowing it is another's and intending to
commit a crime therein.
The centuries-old murder prosecution of John Barclay, reported by
Isaac Ray, provides another illustration of how the mens rea component of the
Integrationist Alternative would work. According to Ray, Barclay was a
mentally retarded individual who was so confused at the time of the killing
that he thought the victim was akin to an ox." 7 If so, he was probably insane
under any test of insanity. But he could also be acquitted on lack-of-mens-rea
grounds. He did not have the mens rea for homicide, because he intended to
kill an animal, not a person.' 18
Now consider examples of the subjective justification component of
the Integrationist Alternative. As noted above, this aspect of the Integrationist
Alternative is virtually identical to the Partial Delusion defense announced by
the House of Lords in M'Naghten, and the M'Naghten case itself provides an
illustration of how it might apply. M'Naghten's paranoia apparently led him
to believe that members of the Tory Party were trying to assassinate him. He
went to the police on several occasions pleading that something be done, but
the police paid no attention to him.' 19 M'Naghten eventually came to believe
he had to take preventive action himself, and devised a plan to eliminate the
leader of the group whom he perceived was tormenting him, Prime Minister
Peel. 20  On this version of the facts, he might well have had a subjective
justification defense. If not, he would still be able to argue imperfect self-
defense, and at least escape conviction for murder.
121
Contrast that case to John Hinckley's and Theodore Kaczynski's.
Hinckley supposedly tried to kill President Reagan because he thought that, if
he did, Jodie Foster would fall in love with him or at least come to live with
him. 22  Hinckley's case obviously presents a much weaker claim of
subjective justification; no jury is likely to find that an attack on the President
of the United States is justified by a desire to improve one's love life.
116. See id.
117. RAY, supra note 21, at 92-93.
118. Barclay would not even be guilty of negligent homicide under the Model Penal Code,
because the Code defines negligence in terms of how a reasonable person would act under the
"circumstances known to him." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d). See Slobogin, supra note 6, at
1239. An individual in Barclay's situation would still be guilty of killing an animal, if such a crime
exists. Of course, conviction would not preclude treatment, or transfer to a mental institution if the
conditions of prison were not appropriate for him.
119. MAEDER, supra note 15, at 27-29.
120. Id.
121. See generally, Douglas Husak, Partial Defenses, 11 CAN. J. L. & JURISPRUDENCE 167
(1998) (describing imperfect self-defense and arguing that all defenses should be available on a partial
basis).
122. See REISNER ET AL., supra note 59, at 539.
335
HeinOnline  -- 30 Am. J. Crim. L. 335 2002-2003
AM. J. CRIM. L.
Similarly, a jury is unlikely to think Kaczynski was justified in mailing letter
bombs to the people he did, even if it assumes as true his belief that our
reliance on technology will bring disaster to the world within the next forty
years.
The third component of the Integrationist Test looks at whether a
person believed circumstances existed that, if true, would have amounted to
duress. The kinds of cases involving mentally ill people that are most
relevant to this defense involve command hallucinations. Assume, as we did
earlier, a mentally ill person believed God ordered him to kill because
otherwise the world would be destroyed. 23 Such a person could well have a
viable defense under the Integrationist Alternative. On the other hand, if the
command from God was, "Commit the crime or constant nightmares will be
your lot," a successful defense would be unlikely. If the reader's reaction to
this kind of conclusion is "But this person is crazy and should be excused!",
be reminded that most people with such delusions do not commit crime, and
that those who do are not provably less culpable than non-mentally ill persons
who offend to impress a lover, make the world a better place, or alleviate
stress.
Finally, consider the limitation on integrationist defenses that applies
when the individual purposely avoids treatment, knowing that hostility-
inducing delusional mental states are likely to occur without such treatment.
The case of Andrea Yates is apposite here. If one subscribes to the defense
theory of the case, Andrea Yates had a strong subjective justification defense
to the homicide charges brought against her for drowning her five children.
The leading defense expert, Dr. Resnick, believed Yates killed her children
because she thought that by doing so she could assure their entry to Heaven,
whereas if she failed to do so they would go to Hell. 124 Assuming that those
delusions existed, and pretending that they represent reality, Yates was
justified in her actions. She might still be convicted in an integrationist
regime, however, if she were responsible for the delusions that she was
experiencing and knew they would lead to hostility toward the children. The
evidence presented at trial indicated that, prior to her crimes, she had hidden
her symptoms from her therapist and avoided taking her medication, knowing
that when off medication she became very irritable with her children and had
experienced delusional desires to harm them on at least two previous
occasions. 125  These kinds of facts would undermine a defense under the
123. See supra text accompanying note 40.
124. Associated Press, Yates Claimed She Killed Kids to Keep Them From Going to Hell (Mar. 1,
2002), available at http://www.courttv.com/trials/yates/030102 pm.html. See also, Deborah W.
Denno, Who is Andrea Yates? A Short Story About Insanity, 10 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y, 37
(2003) ("According to Andrea, the drowning would be a way out because the children 'would go up to
heaven and be with God, be safe."').
125. Park Dietz, Remarks at the Meeting of American Association of Psychiatry and Law
(October 14, 2002) (an expert witness for the prosecution in the Yates case). See also, Associated
Press, Doctor: Yates Suffered Mental Illness (Mar. 8, 2002), at http://www.courttv.com/trials/
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Integrationist Alternative. On the other hand, if she did not believe she was
ill, or was not aware that failure to take treatment would exacerbate her
violent delusions and hostility toward her children, then she could still be
excused.
Different people might apply integrationist analysis differently. The
important point for present purposes is that, under this approach, "insanity"
would no longer be a defense; instead judges and juries would apply the same
defenses to people with mental illness that are applied to people who are not
mentally ill. Professor Bonnie states that the Integrationist Alternative "draws
arbitrary distinctions among equally severe symptoms, among equally
distorted and irrational delusions, and among equally intense delusional
motivations."'' 26 But drawing distinctions based on the Model Penal Code's
choice-of-evils formulations is hardly arbitrary, as those formulations are
bottomed on fundamental normative judgments of society, judgments even
people with mental illness understand. What is arbitrary is drawing
distinctions based on "the intensity of the psychotic experience," the degree to
which the person is "detached" from reality, and the extent to which he or she
could have been more "restrained," which is how Professor Bonnie describes
the test he advocates. 127  The only distinguishing feature in all of these
inquiries is the degree of psychosis, which, as previous discussion indicates,
bears only a tenuous relationship to culpability. If the individual's psychosis
is so flagrant that he is not aware of the nature of his actions, he is excused
under any of the formulations being discussed here, including the
Integrationist test. But for those mental states that fall short of this sort of
unawareness, Professor Bonnie's "degree of psychosis" approach does not
offer any identifiable rationale for separating those who should be exculpated
from those who are not, whereas the Integrationist Alternative does. As a
result, the insanity inquiry under modem formulations is much more prone to
random outcomes than the inquiry required by the Integrationist approach.
In this regard, consider once again the Andrea Yates case. Yates, as I
suggested, probably should have been acquitted unless she knowingly
allowed her hostile delusions to go untreated (and even then, under the Model
Penal Code, she would probably only be guilty of reckless homicide1 28). But
I would be much more uncomfortable acquitting her if, assuming all else to be
yates/030802-illnessap.html (describing hiding of symptoms and refusal to take medication); Teachey,
supra note 1 (reporting that Yates told a psychiatrist two years before the killings: "I had a fear I would
hurt somebody.... I thought it better to end my own life and prevent it. There was a voice, then an
image of the knife. I had a vision in my mind, get a knife, get a knife.... I had a vision of this person
getting stabbed, and the after-effects."); Denno, supra note 124, at 39.
126. Bonnie, Appreciation of Wrongfulness, supra note 63, at 12.
127. Id. at 9.
128. The Model Penal Code's subjective justification defense is always available for intentional
crimes, unless one causes the circumstances of one's excuse with the intention of committing the crime.
See supra note 113. Thus, Professor Bonnie's suggestion that Yates' reckless failure to seek treatment
could result in conviction for first degree murder and a possible sentence of death, see Bonnie,
Appreciation of Wrongfulness, supra note 63, at 9, could not occur under the Integrationist Alternative.
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the same, her reason for killing her children was to prevent them from
growing up to be bad teenagers.' 29 In this scenario, regardless of her general
"craziness," she becomes much more like Susan Smith, the "sane" woman
who drowned her three children so that she could pursue her extramarital
affair unencumbered by them (according to the prosecution in the Smith case)
or because she was suicidal and wanted to take them with her (according to
the defense).13° The reasons for committing the crime should be the all-
important consideration; otherwise, the inquiry devolves into the normatively
empty analysis described above.
In addition to capturing the essence of mental illness' excusing
function in a non-arbitrary way, the Integrationist Alternative might have
several other beneficial consequences. First, it could improve public
perception of the criminal justice system. Conspicuous insanity acquittals
prompt a huge outcry not just against the insanity defense, but against the
entire criminal justice system.13' The Integrationist Alternative would make
acquittals based on mental disorder easier for the public to swallow, because
they would occur only when the accused lacked the intent to commit the
crime or thought he needed to commit the crime due to the threat of a greater
harm. The typical layperson should empathize with that type of acquittal
more readily than one based on the concept of volitional impairment, lack of
appreciation, or irrationality.
The Integrationist Alternative might also help de-stigmatize people
with mental illness, because it treats them the same way we treat
non-mentally ill people. The "criminally insane" are reviled and feared,
probably more so than any other category of people besides terrorists.132 If the
insanity defense is eliminated, the "criminally insane" label is eliminated as
well, which might be a small step toward rehabilitating the image of people
with mental illness.
The third possible benefit of the Integrationist Alternative is the
improvement of treatment for people with mental illness. No matter what
formulation of the insanity defense we choose, there will continue to be large
numbers of mentally ill people in our prisons and jails. 133 Thus, the notion
129. At one point, she suggested this was the case. See Associated Press, supra note 125
(reporting statement of Yates to psychiatrist to the effect that "she became frustrated by what she felt
was a lack of development by her children").
130. Rachel Pergament, The Trial, CRIME LIBRARY (2004), athttp://www.crimelibrary.com/
notoriousmurders/famous/smith/trial_9.html.
131. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 13 (1994)
("The public's outrage over a jurisprudential system that could allow a defendant who shot an
American president on national television to plead 'not guilty' (for any reason) became a 'river of fury'
after the jury's verdict was announced.").
132. See Deborah C. Scott et al., Monitoring Insanity Acquittees: Connecticut's Psychiatric
Security Review Board, 41 HosP. & COMM. PSYCHIATRY 980, 982 (1990) (describing survey response
that called insanity acquittees the "most despised and feared group in society").
133. T. Howard Stone, Therapeutic Implications of Incarceration for Persons with Severe Mental
Disorders: Searching for Rational Health Policy, 24 AM. J. CRIM. L. 283, 285 (1997) (estimating there
are 87,000 people with severe mental disorders in prison).
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that the insanity defense should be used as a method for ensuring treatment
for those with mental illness is not only conceptually nonsensical (since
blameworthiness and treatability do not necessarily coincide), but futile as a
practical matter. Elimination of the insanity defense might focus more
attention on the treatment of all mentally ill people who commit crime. If so,
overall therapeutic impact would be enhanced by substituting the
Integrationist Alternative for the insanity defense, however framed.
V. The Mens Rea Alternative
The Integrationist Alternative may have at least one practical
downside. A jury confronted with an integrationist defense will have to
answer strange, perplexing questions such as: "Is it justifiable to kill people
who are trying to turn one into a homosexual?", 3 4 "Is it justifiable to send out
letter bombs in an effort to prevent the destruction of the world through
technology?", or "Is a person who is threatened by God coerced?" Juries may
have difficulty taking these kinds of inquiries seriously, or dealing with them
sensibly.
That criticism leads to the last test that I was commissioned to
defend, the Mens Rea Alternative. The Mens Rea Alternative would only
provide an excuse for defendants who lacked mens rea. It thus coincides with
the first part of the Integrationist Alternative. But it would not excuse people
based on subjective justification or duress. Accordingly, it not only avoids
the problems associated with existing tests (because it does not contemplate
inquiries into volitionality, appreciation of wrongfulness, or rationality) but
also evades the choice-of-evil conundrums connected with the Integrationist
Alternative.
There are at least four states that have adopted the Mens Rea
Alternative,135 so we know something about how it works. Not surprisingly,
it has reduced acquittals based on mental state defenses. In the state of
Montana before the Mens Rea Alternative was adopted, about 23% of all
mental state defenses succeeded. 36  After the adoption of the Mens Rea
Alternative, only 2.3% of those who asserted mental state defenses
prevailed. 137 Thus, the Mens Rea Alternative seems to have occasioned a
134. Cf. Cruse v. State, 580 So.2d 983 (La. App. 1991). The answer should presumably be "no",
given the usual rejection of "gay panic" defenses asserted by non-psychotic individuals who claim they
killed when homosexual advances by the victim brought out repressed homosexuality that results in
violence. This was the defense raised, and rejected, in the case of the two defendants who killed
Matthew Shepard in Wyoming. See Bryan Robinson, McKinney Convicted of First-degree Felony
Murder in Matthew Shepard Murder Slaying (Nov. 3, 1999), at http://www.courttv.com/
trials/mckinney/l 10399_verdictctv.html.
135. See IDAHO CODE § 181-207 (1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3220 (1995); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-14-214 (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305 (1999).
136. LISA CALLAHAN ET AL., POLICY RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., THE IMPACT OF MONTANA'S
INSANITY DEFENSE ABOLITION (July, 1988) (cited in REISNER ET AL., supra note 59, at 588).
137. Id.
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huge decline in the number of acquittals by reason of mental state. At the
same time, however, defendants who raise mental state defenses and are
convicted in Montana today are much less likely to go to prison and much
more likely to receive probation than before the adoption of the Mens Rea
Alternative. 38 Additionally, there are now many more dismissals based on a
finding of incompetency to stand trial.139 In other words, Montana has
experienced a balloon-squeezing phenomenon - an adjustment to one part of
the system resulting in accommodations in other parts of the system. That
suggests that the Mens Rea Alternative defines the scope of exculpatory
mental disorder too narrowly, at least for the judges who make sentencing and
incompetency decisions in Montana.
The Mens Rea Alternative has been attacked on constitutional
grounds. The principal argument is that eliminating the insanity defense,
which the Mens Rea Alternative does, infringes upon due process. But most
state courts that have heard these arguments have rejected them. The Montana
Supreme Court held, for instance, that so long as mental disease is considered
at sentencing, abolition of the insanity defense is not unconstitutional.' 4 °
Nonetheless, it is worthwhile speculating what the United States
Supreme Court would say about the Mens Rea Alternative. In Leland v.
Oregon,14 1 the Court held that the due process clause does not prohibit forcing
a defendant to prove insanity beyond a reasonable doubt.142  If that 1952
holding still stands, the insanity defense must not be a very crucial component
of the criminal justice system. Based on Leland, in other words, one could
predict that the Court would say the defense is not a fundamental aspect of
due process. But then there is the more recent Supreme Court case of
Montana v. Egelhoff,143 which was decided in 1996. Egelhoff arose when the
Montana legislature, apparently an entity that likes to eliminate defenses,
abolished the intoxication defense. Challenged as an infringement of due
process, the Montana statute was upheld by the Supreme Court.' 44 But the
primary reason the Court gave for this holding was that the intoxication
defense is of "recent vintage" and thus not a fundamental aspect of criminal
justice. 145 In contrast, of course, the insanity defense is not of recent vintage;
138. See id.
139. Id. See also HENRY STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY: EVALUATING
INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM 136 (1994) (recounting that in Montana after the reform those who
normally would have been found insane were instead found incompetent and placed in the "same
hospital and the same wards where they would have been confined if they had been found NGRI").
140. State v. Korrell, 690 P.2d 992, 1002 (Mont. 1984). See also, State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914
(Idaho 1990). State v. Herrera, 895 P.2d 359 (Utah 1995). But see Finger v. State, 117 Nev. 548, 27
P.3d 66 (2001) (striking down Nevada's mens rea alternative statute).
141. 343 U.S. 790 (1952).
142. Id. at 799.
143. 518 U.S. 37 (1996).
144. Id. at 51 ("Although the rule allowing a jury to consider evidence of a defendant's voluntary
intoxication where relevant to mens rea has gained considerable acceptance, it is of too recent vintage,
and has not received sufficiently uniform and permanent allegiance, to qualify as fundamental.").
145. Id.
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it is ancient. Perhaps, therefore, when the Supreme Court hears a case
challenging the Mens Rea Alternative, it will hold that mental disorder must
be allowed to play a greater role in blameworthiness assessments.
That holding would not threaten the Integrationist Alternative,
however. If M'Naghten is a constitutionally adequate formulation of
insanity, 146 then the Integrationist Alternative should be as well. Because the
latter approach is better than M'Naghten at giving mental illness its proper
exculpatory scope, and at the same time avoids the pitfalls of the Volitional,
Appreciation, and Rationality Tests, it should be seriously considered as a
replacement for the insanity defense.
146. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 792 (1952) suggested as much.
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